New motion, complaint filed on behalf of officers, worker
Published 3:55 pm Tuesday, March 26, 2019
Two new documents have been filed in Dallas County Circuit Court on behalf of the three Selma Police Department (SPD) officers placed on administrative leave last year and former Selma Parks and Recreation Department employee Carneetie Ellison, who was dismissed from her position last year as part of a slate of lay-offs handed down in November.
Montgomery attorney Julian McPhillips, who is representing Ellison and all three SPD officers, filed an amended complaint last week on behalf of all four plaintiffs alleging that the city, in dismissing the four from their respective positions, is guilty of violating the plaintiffs’ due process rights, wrongful termination and breach of contract.
The complaint lays out the timeline of events that led to each plaintiff’s “constructive discharge,” beginning with the Sept. 26, 2018 notification that the three SPD officers – Jeffrey Hardy, Toriano Neely and Kendall Thomas – were being “temporarily placed” on “administrative leave with pay until further notice.”
The complaint states that Acting Personnel Director Sean VanDiver informed the officers in a letter that they were being placed on leave due to a “pending outside agency investigation.”
On behalf of the officers, McPhillips addressed letters to Mayor Darrio Melton, SPD Chief Spencer Collier and VanDiver on Oct. 1, 2018 protesting the decision and requesting more information, as well as “demanding a retraction of defamatory statements” – no reply was ever received, the complaint states.
On Oct. 30, 2018, a letter was addressed to then-City Attorney Jimmy Nunn requesting a hearing before the city’s Personnel Board, saying the reasons given for the officers’ termination were “a pretext and a prelude for their constructive termination” – no reply was ever received.
A few days later, the officers received a letter from Collier stating that they “had been placed on unpaid administrative leave until further notice.”
On Nov. 15, 2018, once the city lay-offs had taken place, McPhillips addressed a letter to Personnel Board representative James Ware to request a hearing for the officers and Ellison; two weeks later, another letter was sent to VanDiver, which included the letter sent to Ware – requesting a hearing before the Personnel Board – no reply was received for either letter, according to the complaint.
Another letter sent to VanDiver on Dec. 6, 2018 was similarly not responded to.
On Dec. 21, 2018, McPhillips and the four plaintiffs went to city hall and addressed VanDiver in person and were told that Ellison and the officers were not entitled to a hearing. VanDiver provided no explanation for the plaintiffs’ ineligibility and stated that McPhillips’ should speak with attorney Rick Howard, who he said was representing Melton and the City of Selma.
McPhillips spoke with Howard that afternoon – Howard stated that he “did not represent and could not represent the City of Selma in any case” involving the officers because he was representing them “in other cases brought by other parties against the City of Selma,” the complaint states.
On the allegations of violation of due process rights, which McPhillips alleges are justified due to the city’s refusal to allow the plaintiffs to have a hearing before the city’s Personnel Board, breach of contract and wrongful termination, the complaint asks for back pay, lost wages and benefits, compensatory damages for “mental anguish and emotional distress,” court costs and attorneys’ fees.
“Like any other indicted individuals, they are entitled to due process and motions such as this are part of that,” Collier said. “However, the Selma Police Department fully supports the Alabama Attorney General’s office and its investigation.”
On Monday, McPhillips filed a motion demanding the court order the state to produce the identity of each grand jury witness involved in hearings regarding the three officers and provide the relevant testimonies.
The motion acknowledges that “Alabama has long protected the secrecy of grand jury proceedings,” but cites Blackmon v. State, which states that “a defendant may be allowed to inspect grand jury proceedings if the defendant meets the threshold test of showing a ‘particularized need’ for breaching the secrecy of those proceedings.”
The motion states the reason for the officers’ indictments was “knowingly falsifying, concealing or covering up any material fact by any trick, scheme or device” or “making a materially false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or representation.”
The motion alleges that the state “has produced little, if any, information” and that the defendants are “unaware of each individual that the state intends to call as witnesses at trial” and is “similarly unaware of each witness that the state called before the grand jury in obtaining” indictments.
In a memorandum provided to the defendants in February, the state references statements made by investigator Susan Smith which reference “a number of other individuals” employed or associated with the Alabama Attorney General’s office, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), as well as Collier and other SPD officers.
“Certainly, the testimony of each witness called before the grand jury is relevant to the subject matter of the state’s prosecution,” the motion states. “Likewise, there may exist inconsistencies between what a witness said before the grand jury and what that witness says at trial. At a minimum, this court should be made aware of each of the state’s witnesses so that it may conduct an in-camera inspection of the testimony of each witness who testified before the grand jury.”
Without such information, the motion claims, “each defendant not only remains without knowledge of how we has possibly violated” Alabama law and is “without knowledge of what a grand jury witness may inconsistently say at trial.”